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Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for Negligent Homicide, a class A 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-206. This Court has 
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann.§ 78A-4-103(2)(e). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by not allowing individual 
questioning of potential jurors who demonstrated no indication of bias after 
it asked specific questions requested by defense counsel as to their personal 
experience with serious car wrecks? 
Standard of Review. Review is for abuse of discretion. See Miller v. Utah 
Dept. ofTransp., 2012 UT 54, ,I36, 285 P.3d 1208. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by admitting a 
nongruesome photograph of the victim at the crime scene when that 
photograph was directly probative of an essential element of the crime 
charged? 
Standard of Review. A trial court's evidentiary rulings are reviewed for 
abuse of discretion. State v. Gulbransen, 2005 UT 7, if 35, 106 P.3d 734. 
3. Did the trial court adequately instruct the jury on the law of 
criminal negligence? 
Standard of Review. A h·ial court's refusal to give a purposed jury 
instruction is a question of law, reviewed for correctness. State v. Hamilton, 
827 P.2d 232, 238 (Utah 1992). 
4. Did the State produce sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction 
for negligent homicide? 
Standard of review. In assessing a claiin of insufficiency of the evidence, 
the court reviews the evidence and all inferenc~s which may reasonably be 
drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury. State v. 
1\1aestas, 2012 UT 46, if 302, 299 P.3d 892. This Court does "not re-evaluate the 
credibility of witnesses or second-guess the jury's conclusion"; it determines 
"only whether sufficient competent evidence was admitted to satisfy each 
element of the charge, whether sufficient evidence was before the jury to 
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enable it to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed 
the crime." State v. Honie, 2002 UT 4, if 44, 57 P.3d 977 (citation omitted). 
5. Does the cumulative effect of any errors undermine confidence 
in the jury verdict? 
Standard of Review. No standard of review applies to this issue. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-206: 
Negligent homicide. 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes negligent hmnicide if the 
actor, acting with criminal negligence, causes the death of 
another. 
Utah Code Ann.§ 76-2-103(4): 
A person engages in conduct: 
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with 
respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of 
his conduct when he ought to be aware of a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will 
·occur.The risk must be of a nature and degree that the failure to 
perceive it c~nstitutes a gross deviation from the standard of 
care lha t an ordinary person would exercise in all the 
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE1 
On September 22, 2012, Francisco Garcia was killed when the car he 
was riding in as a passenger was struck by the defendant's vehicle. The car 
that Mr. Garcia was traveling in was passing through the intersection on a 
green light. R395:81-82, 412:98, 434:120, 451:137, 457:143. The defendant ran 
a red light as he entered the intersection. Id. 
This crash occurred at the intersection of Bangerter Highway and the 
201 Freeway overpass. R395:81, 414:100, 448:134, State's Exh. 23-28. 
Bangerter Highway is a fast moving highway, with a speed limit of 50 miles 
per hour. R532:218. The State's accident reconstructionist testified that roads 
with greater speeds create a greater i1npact and thus carry a greater risk of 
fatalities with crashes. R542:228. 
The first call for the crash was made to dispatch at 6:08 a.m. R482:168. 
M~ndy Grange, the person who made the 911 call, testified that she placed 
the call within seconds of the collision. R416:102-103, 436:122. That morning, 
the defendant was heading to work for a shift that started at 6:00 a.m. 
R653:77. The defendant was expected to be prompt for his shift, and even one 
minute after 6:00 a.m. was considered late. R596:20. 
1 The facts are recited in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. 
See State v. Berriel, 2011 UT App 317, ,r 3 n.3, 262 P.3d 1212. 
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Prior to the crash, witnesses Mike and Brittney Grange testified that 
they noticed the defendant driving on Bangerter Highway. They testified 
they first noticed the defendant because he was weaving in and out' of lanes. 
R409:95. This weaving continued several times over several miles as the 
defendant traveled northbound on Bangerter Highway. R409:95, 412:98, 
430:116-117. In addition to weaving in and out of his lanes, the defendant 
was traveling at a very high rate of speed. R410:96-98, 432. The defendant's 
driving pattern was so concerning that the Grange's decided to call 911 out of 
concern for the safety of other people on the road. R410:96. 
After deciding to call 911, Mike Grange attempted to get close to the 
defendant in an effort to get his license plate number. Mr. Grange at one 
point was traveling as fast as 70 mph in an effort to catch up to the defendant. 
R411:97. Even at this speed, the defendant maintained a distance, and Mr. 
Grange was unable to catch up. Id. 
Mr. and Mrs. Grange did eventually catch up to the defendant at 
Bangerter Highway and Parkway Blvd. where the defendant was stopped at 
a red light. R434:120. After the light changed, the defendant continued this 
same pattern of speeding, weaving, and errati~ driving. R434:120. As the 
defendant approached the intersection where the crash occurred, both Mr. 
and Mrs. Grange testified they could see that the defendant was approaching 
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a red light at a high rate of speed. R412:98, 414:100, 434:120-121, State's Exh. 
24. Both watched as the defendant ran the red light. Brittney Grange 
testified that the defendant's brake lights never came on prior to the collision. 
R435:121. Mike Grange watched the defendant's car approach the 
intersection and estimated that he may have been traveling between 70 and 
90 mph. R423:109. 
Stephanie Dayvell was traveling opposite the defendant, in the same 
direction as the victim, Francisco Garcia. R450:136, State's Exh. 25. She was 
traveling behind Mr. Garcia's vehicle, so the crash happened directly in her 
line of sight. Ms. Dayvell testified that she did not see any headlights on the 
defendant's car. R452:138, 457:143. It was dark outside at time of the crash. 
R400:86, R418:104, R445:131, R452:138,140,131, R473:l59. 
The subsequent investigation of Darren Mower, the accident 
reconstructionist assigned to the case, corroborated Ms. Dayvell' s testimony. 
As part of his investigation, Det. Mower inspected the defendant's car at the 
scene of the crash. R486:172. Upon inspecting the defendant's vehicle, Det. 
Mower discovered that the light switch on the defendant's car was in the 
park position. Id., State's Exh. 17. In t~e park position, the taillights and side 
amber lights were illuminated, but the headlights were not. _R486:172-173. 
-6-
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The accident reconstructionist cquld only provide a "best estimate" for 
the speed in this case. R497:183. He tried several of the traditional formulas 
for determining speed, but could not apply them here. He could not apply 
the "conservation of momentum" formula to this case because the crash 
happened and different angles can affect accuracy of that formula. R498:184. 
He could not apply the "conservation of energy" formula because there were 
multiple cars involved in the collision. R499:185. He could not pull the 
speed from the air bag control module on the defendant's car because this 
make did not provide any information that could be downloaded. RS00:186. 
With none of these primary methods for determining speed available, he had 
to give his "_best estimate" based on prior experience. RS0l:187. In doing so, 
he estimated the defendant was traveling at a minimum of 50 mph. 501:187. 
The accident reconstructionist also determined that just prior to the 
crash, the defendant drifted from the left, inside lane to the right lane of 
travel where the crash occurred. R495:181-83, State's Exh. 22. 
Testimony of Defendant 
At trial the defendant took the stand and relayed to the jury_ his 
men1ory of the drive prior to the crash. R623:47-106. The defendant testified 
that while this intersection was on his regular work route, he typically 
crossed this intersection as a passenger in the car and had only driven 
,...., 
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through it two, possibly three, times. R626:50. However, Mr. Holm later 
admitted that prior to the crash he had been through the intersection, at least 
as a passenger, over 80 times. R672:96-98. 
The defendant testified that as he drove along Bangerter prior to the 
crash, all of the intersections he passed (aside from the one where the crash 
occurred), were typical "T" intersections. R630:54. The defendant also 
testified that he was not in a rush to get to work, and felt no pressure to get 
there at a certain time. R646:70. The defendant also testified that he had his 
headlights on. R643:67-68. 
The defendant testified that as he approached the intersection of the 
201 and Bangerter Highway, he was driving near the posted speed limit. 
R632:54, 648:72. He testified that he was not fixing the radio, not drowsy, not 
ea ting anything, and was not otherwise distracted as he was driving. 
R648:72, 650:74. The defendant also testified that as he approached the 
intersection he was looking at the lights and could see green lights. R635:59-
63. There were red lights in the intersection, but they were off to one side. 
The more obvious and constant lights, were green. R636:60, 62-63. He also 
testified that from the lane he was traveling in, there was a pole that 
obstructed his view of the red lights. R649:73 The defendant testified that he 
thought he had a green light to pass through the intersection. R640:64. The 
-8-
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defendant claimed that he even checked for opposing traffic in the 
intersection in an effort to figure out what was going on and in the end 
concluded that he had a green light and was supposed to go. R639:63, 660:84. 
The defendant claimed that he even checked the lights a second time as he 
passed through the intersection, this time noticing the red light, but by that 
time he simply didn't have enough time to stop. R641:65. 
The defendant testified that he was ultimately confused at the lights in 
the intersection. R660:84. 
Evidence that contradicted defendant's story 
In contrast to the defendant's description of the intersection, several 
witnesses testified during the trial that they pass through the intersection on 
a regular basis and have never been confused by the lights. R401:87, 414:100, 
436:122, 458:144. Mike Grange testified that even from where he was at the 
time of the crash, which was a great distance behind, he could clearly see that 
the defendant was approaching a red light. R412:98-100, State's Exh. 24. 
Brittney Grange also testified that she could clearly see the defendant 
approaching a red light and expected him to stop. R434:120-121. 
In addition to this independent eyewitness testimony, Detective 
Mower created a video recording where he drove the same route on 
Bangerter Highway as the defendant. R507:193-198. He drove the route in 
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the early morning, with similar lighting and traffic. R507:193. This video 
recording was submitted to the jury as State's Exhibit 20. Id. The video also 
contains a segment where Detective Mower parked his car in the same lqne 
the defendant was traveling and recorded the light sequence of the 
intersection. R510:196-198. In addition to Exhibit 20, State's Exhibits 18 and 
19, which are still photographs of the lights at the intersection, ,vere 
submitted to the jury. R512:198-201. 
State's Exhibit 20 shows how clearly visible the red lights are in the 
intersection. On cross examination, the defendant admitted that the video 
demonstrates that from about 200 feet away from the intersection you could 
clearly see the red light. R667:91-92. The defendant admitted you can only 
see the red light and that from a few car lengths back you cannot see any 
green lights. R665:89, 667:91. The defendant admitted that upon review of 
State's Exhibit 20, the first lights you can see in the intersection are two clear, 
bright, red lights that are directly in front of you. R667:91. The defendant 
also agreed that Exhibit 20 de1nonstrates that there are no obstructions that 
would block the lights. R668:92-93. Finally the defendant agreed that Exhibit 
20 shows that you would have to look past the clear, bright, red lights in 
order to see any green lights in the distance. R667:91, 93. 
-10-
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Testimony of EMT 
During the trial, the jury also heard testimony from Scott Hall, the fire 
EMT who responded to the scene of the crash. Mr. Hall is the EMT seen in 
Exhibit 26 attending to the victim. R462:148, 469:155, State's Exh. 26. Mr. 
Hall testified that the victim was the first person in the car that they attended 
to. R465:151. He testified that the victim was not breathing and had no pulse. 
Id. Mr. Hall stated that when tested, the victim showed "Pulseless Electrical 
Activity" (P.E.A.) which means that while he had no pulse and was not 
breathing, his heart had not flat-lined. R465:151-152. IVIr. Hall also testified 
that EMT's on scene followed protocol at that point to attend to other 
members of the vehicle before extrie.a ting the victim in an effort to focus 
resources and to save the most people they could in a mass casualty 
situation. R467:153-155. He also testified that under this protocol the victim 
was the last to be exh·icated from the car. Mr. Hall opened the victim's 
airway and continued to monitor his P.E.A. until they were able to remove 
.him. R468:154. When they were able to remove the victim from the car, 
EMT's performed CPR until minutes later when his heart flat-lined and he 
was pronounced dead. R471:157-158. 
State's Exhibit 26 corroborates Mr. Hall's testimony. The P.E.A. 
machine is depicted on the victiln' s chest. R470:156. Mr. Hall is in the photo 
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securing the airway passage open. R470:156. The door that kept the victim 
from being pulled out by paramedics until extrication equipment was 
available is also depicted in the photograph. R470:156-157. 
An autopsy revealed that Fransico Garcia died of blunt force injuries to 
the chest. R591:15. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I: The trial court asked sufficient questions to allow counsel to 
evaluate the jurors' potential bias. Specifically, the court asked all questions 
requested by Defense counsel pertaining to jurors' experience with serious 
car crashes. The court followed up with those specific jurors to determine if 
that experience created a potential bias. Any potential juror who indicated a 
concern for a potential bias was brought in for individual questioning. This 
allowed counsel adequate opportunity to evaluate the jurors. Additionally, 
any error was harmless. 
Point II: The EMT testified that when he arrived on scene the 
victin!'s heart was still showing some electrical activity. Because the victim 
was pinned in the car, his removal and CPR was delayed. Exhibit 26 
corroborated the EMT' s testimony that they followed protocol and did 
everything they could to save the victim. This evidence was demonstrated 
that the work of EMT's was not an intervening cause of the victim's death. 
-12-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Further, the danger of unfair prejudice is low because the photo shows little 
to no blood, is not an enlargement, and shows the victim exactly how he 
appeared on ~cene. 
Point III: The simple negligence instruction requested by the 
defendant is not appropriate for a criminal negligence case. The court gave 
the jury detailed instructions of what constitutes criminal negligence as well 
as instructions on what falls short of criminal negligence. Further, the 
defendant was not prejudiced because his own testimony contradicted a 
t~eory that h~ was guilty of even simple negligence. 
Point IV: There was sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction for 
negligent homicide. The defendant's erratic driving pattern, speeding, 
weaving in and out of lanes, driving without headlights in the dark, and 
running a red light at near freeway speeds demonstrate repeated deviations 
from the standard of care that created a grave risk of death. When taken 
together, the defendant's actions were a gross deviation from the standard of 
care an ordinary person would exercise. When viewed in a light most 
favorable to the jury's verdict, there was more than sufficient evidence to 
sustain. a conviction. 
Point V: There were no errors in the trial that resulted in the defendant 
receiying an unfair trial. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION BY REFUSING TO QUESTION JURORS 
WHO DEMONSTRATED NO INDICATION OF BIAS. 
During the voir dire process, the court instructed the potential jurors 
that, if selected, they must base their ver<lict solely on the evidence, free fronl 
any biases or prejudice. The court instructed the jury that their verdict could 
not be based on personal experience, or what has happened in their lives, and 
asked if anyone would have a problem following that instruction. R354:40. 
To this question no hands were raised. 
At the request of defense counsel, the trial court specifically asked the 
jury panel if any of them had ever personally been involved in a serious car 
accident. R353:39. Some members of the jury raised their hands. Later, 
defense requested that the court broaden the question asked earlier to 
include whether anyone close to them had ever been involved in a serious car 
accident. R355:41. The trial court granted this request and asked the potential 
jurors if anyone close to them had ever been involved in a serious car 
accident. R355:41. Several jurors raised their hands. R355:41-42. The court 
then asked those who raised their hands: 
-14-
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"Is there anything about that experience that makes you feel like you 
might be biased for one side or the other?" R356:42. 
To this question a few jurors raised their hands. All who indicated 
they may be biased were further questioned individually outside the 
presence of other members of the jury. R359:45-54. During this time the 
court allowed counsel for defendant to ask any follow up questions they 
wanted. The only question defense counsel asked was to juror number 13 
when he asked: 
"Do you think you could give him a fair trial? And I understand you 
would do yo~r best, but are you confident about it?" R363:49. 
The juror replied: "I think so." This juror was then excused. With this 
answer, the defense did not make a for cause challenge to the juror. R363:49. 
A. The totality of the questioning gave counsel ample 
opportunity to evaluate the jurors. 
Vair dire (1) ferrets out bias that would render a prospective juror 
constitutionally incompetent to serve and (2) elicits sufficient information to 
allow trial counsel to intelligently exercise peremptory challenges. State v. 
Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d 861, 866-69 (Utah 1998). "The scope and conduct of 
voir dire examination is within the discretion of the trial judge." Id. at 867. 
Trial " ✓ courts should be permissive in allowing voir dire questions and 
-15-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
should exercise their discretion in favor of allowing counsel to elicit 
information from prospective jurors."' Id. at 868. 
However, the Utah Supreme court has clarified that "trial judges are 
· not compelled to permit evenJ question that is 'appropriate' in the sense that 
it might disclose some basis for counsel to favor or disfavor seating a 
particular juror." Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d at 868. Nor is "a defendant entitled 
to 'ask questions in a particular manner."' Taylor v. State, 2007 UT 12, ,I70, 
156 P.3d 739 (quoting Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d at 867) (citing Mu'Min v. Virginia, 
500 U.S. 415, 431 (1991)) ("[A]s long as the relevant subject area of potential 
bias was covered, the Fourteenth Amendment was not violated by the failure 
to ask questions in a particular manner."). A "trial court must possess 
discretion" in conducting voir dire "because of the multitude of factual 
variations that may affect the proper scope of questioning." Piansiaksone, 954 
P.2d at 868. 
The amount of discretion varies depending on the nature of the 
question sought to be asked. Id. Vair dire II questions which more directly 
search for questionable attitudes among jurors deserve more favorable 
treahnent by trial courts than those which require multiple inferential steps 
or follow-up questions to ~lucidate real or possible bias." Id. Thus, a trial 
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related to bias and prejudice, but increases as the directness of that relation 
decreases or, in some instances, where the question unduly intrudes upon the 
privacy of the jurors." Id.; see also State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, ,r 43, 992 P.2d 
951. A trial court does not abuse its discretion in limiting voir dire if, 
"considering the totality of the qu~stioning, counsel was afforded an 
adequate opportunity to gain the information necessary to evaluate jurors." 
Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d at 868 (quotation and citation omitted); see also Miller v. 
Utah Dept. ofTransp., 2012 UT 54, ,r,r 36-37, 285 P.3d 1208. 
In this case, the cc~mrt asked sufficient q"?estions to allow counsel to 
gain information necessary to evaluate the juror's potential bias based on 
experience with car wrecks. The court did not limit voir dire to superficial 
questions of fairness. Indeed, the court did ask such general questions at 
other points during the selection process, but when asked by defense counsel 
to probe into more specific areas of potential bias, the court did so. 
The court first inquired as to whether anyone had personally been in a 
serious car wreck. The word "serious" specified situations where the wreck 
was more than a simple fender bender and invited jurors to cohsider 
situations similar to that of the case before the court. Upon request of 
counsel, in an effort to illicit more people with potential bias, the court 
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broadened the ~quiry to include whether any of them had someone dose to 
the1n involved in a serious car wreck. 
The court then asked a question that directly addressed potential bias 
based on this experience by asking if the experience would cause them to be 
biased for one side or the other. This was a not a rehabilitative question 
"designed to qualify the jurors as quickly as possible." Saunders, 1999 UT at 
1 34. It was not a general question to everyone in the panel. This question 
was directed only at those with a potential bias based on a very specific 
personal experience. The judge did not give an instruction and then ask the 
jurors if they could follow it. The judge asked an open ended question of 
bias that invited specific jurors to evaluate, in the narrow context of the 
relevant issue, whether or not they had a potential bias. 
The fact that the judge did not bring jurors with no potential bias in for 
individual questioning does not demonstrate an abuse of discretion. As 
noted, the defendant was not entitled to "ask questions in a particular 
manner." Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d at 867; see also Miller, 2012 UT 54, ,r,r 36-37 
(no abuse of discretion where court substituted its own voir dire question 
that probed area of plaintiff's concern). The court asked adequate questions 
of this specific issue and conducted further inquiry of tI:iose who 
demonstrated a potential bias. 
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Each juror who indicated that they may be biased was brought in for 
further questioning. During that questioning, the court placed no limit on 
the questions defense counsel asked. Counsel for the defense then asked one 
question of one of those jurors. The question defense counsel chose to ask 
illustrates how well the courts original question covered the issue. Defense 
counsel asked, "Do you think you could give him a fair trial?" R363:49. This 
question is almost identical to the question asked by the court before the 
jurors were brought in for individual questioning. 
None of the details listed by defendant would illustrate a potential bias 
or a reason a person would be unfit to serve as a juror. Br.Aplt. 23. They 
would "require multiple inferential steps or follow-up questions to elucidate 
real or possible bias." Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d at 868. At best, this information 
may have given a basis for counsel to "favor or disfavor seating a particular 
juror" but this is not a reason to compel the court to inquire further than it 
did in this case. Id. 
B. Any error was harmless. 
Even if the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to bring 
unbiased jurors in for individual questioning, any error was harmless. 
Failing "to ask an appropriate question on voir dire does not always 
constitute an abuse of discretion requiring reversal." Evans ex rel. Evans v. 
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Doty, 824 P.2d 460, 467-68 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). This Court will reverse only 
if "considering the totality of the questioning, counsel [is not] afforded an 
adequate opportunity to gain the information necessary to evaluate jurors." 
State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 448 (Utah 1988) (overruled in part on other grounds 
by State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398-99 (Utah 1994)). 
As shown, the totality of the questioning- including the specific 
questions regarding jurors experiences with car crashes- afforded defense 
counsel an adequate opportunity to evaluate the jurors. Thus, any error in 
failing to individually question unbiased witnesses was harmless. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY 
ADMITTING A NONGRUESOME PHOTOGRAPH OF THE 
VICTIM AT THE CRIME SCENE. 
The State is entitled to the "'legitimate moral force"' of its evidence and 
has "'the right to prove its case up to the hilt in whatever manner it" chooses, 
"subject only to the rules of evidence and standards of fair play."' State v. 
Florez, 777 P.2d 452, 455 (Utah 1989) (citation omitted). The applicable Utah 
Rules of Evidence are 401,402, and 403. 
Evidence is relevant if it "has any tendency to make a fact more or less 
probable than it would be w~thout the evidence,/f and "the fact is of 
consequence in determining the action." Utah R. Evid. 401. All relevant 
evidence is generally admissible. Utah R. Evid. 402. But relevant evidence is 
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inadmissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by its potential 
for unfair prejudice. Utah R. Evid. 403. 
But under. rule 403, evidence is presumed admissible unless the 
defendant can show that the risk of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs 
the photos' probative value. See State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, ,r 44, 52 P.3d 1210; 
State v. Dunr1:, 85~ P.2d 1201, 1221-22 (Utah 1993). Simple prejudice is not 
enough to exclude evidence; after all, "all effective evidence is prejudicial in 
the sense of being damaging to the party against whom it is offered." State v . 
. Maurer, 770 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1989) (citations ar:id quotation omitted). 
Rather, the rule is concerned only with unfair prejudice. Unfair prejudice is 
that which has "an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper 
basis." Id. (citations and quotation 0111itted). A "trial court's decision to 
admit evidence under rule 403" is reviewed for abuse of discretion and only 
overturned if it is "'beyond.the limits of reasonability."' Diversified Holdings, 
L:C. v. Turner, 2002 UT 129, ,r 6, 63 P.3d 686 (citation omitted). 
A photo is not rendered irrelevant or otherwise inadmissible merely 
because the evidence may be described rather than shown. State v. 
Gulbransen, 2005 UT 7, ,r 38, 106 P.3d 734; State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, ii 54, 
993 P.2d 837; State v. Cobb, 774 P.2d 1123, 1125 (Utah 1989)~ As stated, subject 
to the Rules of Evidence, the prosecution has "the opportunity of profiting 
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from. the 'legitimate moral force' of _its evidence in persuading a jury." 
Gulbransen, 2005 UT at ,r 38. ( citations and quotation omitted). 
In this case, the State was required to prove that the defendant's 
. ' 
negligence (and the resulting crash) was the proximate cause of the victim's 
death. While the victim was pronounced dead at the scene, he was not dead 
when emergency personnel arrived. These circumstances raise the issue of 
whether the victim could have been saved, and whether the actions of 
emergency responders were an intervening cause of the victim's death. 
The testimony of EMT Scott Hall was that the victim had not flat-lined 
and still had electrical activity in his heart. Despite the P.E.A. the victim 
demonstrated, he was not immediately removed from the car to undergo 
CPR. Not until later, when EMT's could remove the victim from the vehicle 
did they attempt CPR before the victim's heart eventually flat-lined. Mr. Hall 
testified that they followed protocol for this type of casualty situation. 
State's Exhibit 26 corroborates Mr. Hall's testimony. The P.E.A. 
machine is depicted on the victim's chest. R470:156, State's Exh. 26. Mr. Hall 
is in the photo securing the airway passage open. Id. The door that kept the 
victim from being pulled out by paramedics until extrication equipment 
became available is also depicted in the photograph. R470:156-157. All of this 
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corroborating evidence was highly probative of an essential element in this 
case: cause of death. 
Defense claims that cause of death was not a disputed issue at trial. 
Brf.Aplt.29. They argue that their decision to pursue a theory of criminal 
negligence, rather than causation, somehow diminishes the probative value 
of evidence showing causation. But so long as Mr. Holm maintained his plea 
of not guilty, the state was entitled to prove its case "up to the hilt." Florez, 
777 P.2d at 455 (citation omitted). State's Exhibit 26 was visible, tangible 
evidence that helped show there was no intervening cau~e that lead to the 
death of the victim. 
Further, the danger of unfair prejudice is low. None of the victim's life 
threatening injuries are depicted in the photograph. There are no major 
wounds or bruising. There is a small amount of blood coming from the 
victhn's nose and a small cut on his lip. The exhibit shows the paramedic 
attending to the victim, and the victim appears exactly how he was found at 
the crime scene. The photograph is not a disto~ted close up with extraneous 
objects that would exacerbate the impact on the viewer. See Bluff, 2002 UT at 
151. 
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Because the probative value of the photograph was very high and was 
not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, the court did 
not err ~ allowing the photo to be presented to the jury. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ADEQUATELY INSTRUCTED THE 
JURY ON THE APPLICABLE LAW. 
"A trial court has a duty to instruct the jury on the law applicable to 
the facts of the case." State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 238 (Utah 1992). The 
defendant has a right to have his theory of the case presented to the jury in a 
clear and understandable way. Id. However, "it is not error to refuse a 
proposed instruction if the point is properly covered in other instructions." 
Id. Even in the context of the defendant's mental state, it is not essential to a 
fair trial that specific terms requested by the defendant be used, or that a 
separate instruction be given, so long as the explanation of the appropriate 
mental state is found sufficient. State v. Sessions, 645 P.2d 643, 646 (Utah 
1982). 
A trial court's refusal to give a purposed jury instruction is a question 
of law, which is reviewed for correctness. Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 238. 
A. The Simple Negligence Instruction Is Inappropriate For a 
Criminal Negligence Case. 
The defense subn1itted the Utah Model Jury Instruction (MUJI) for 
simple negligence. Brf.Aplt.Addendum D. According to the MUJI 
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. ' 
committee, this instruction was provided to be used in very limited criminal 
cases. There are two types of cases listed by the Committee .. 
The· first is Automobile Homicide as a Third Degree Felony pursuant 
to U.C.A. § 76-5-207(2). Under this statute, a person is guilty of a third 
degree felony if they operate a motor vehicle in a negligent manner causing 
the death of another and have a blood alcohol of .08 grams or higher; or have 
enough alcohol or drugs in their system to render them incapable of safely 
operating the vehicle. Id. The statute specifies that "as used in this 
Subsection (2), 'negligent' means simple negligence, the failure to exercise 
that degree of care that reasonable and prudent persons exercise under like 
or similar circumstances." Id. In this context, th~ simple negl_igence standard 
is an element of the offense, and the statute very specifically calls for this 
definition. 
The second type of case li~ted by the Committee is De~ling Harmful 
Material to a Minor pursuant to U.C.A. § 76-10-1206. Like the automobile 
homicide statute,§ 76-10-1206(1) uses the word "negligently", distinguishing 
it from other criminal cases where criminal negligence is the required mental 
state. In State v. Haltom, as part of the defendant's argument, he conceded 
that ordinary negligence was sufficient to violate § 76-10-1206. 2007 UT 22, 
if 6, 156 P.3d 792. The Utah Supreme Court agreed. Id. 
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Both of these specific situations mentioned by the MUJI Committee are 
clear (either by statute or court interpretation) -~hat simple negligence is the 
requisite mental state for the crime charged. The Committee warned that 
"caution should be exercised to ensure the appropriate mental state 
instruction is used in criminal cases 1.phere negligence is asserted." See CR305, 
Committee Notes (emphasis added). The Committee's desire to guard 
against the confusion that may arise in the criminal negligence context is 
illustrated by the specificity with which they list out the auto homicide 
statute. The committee very specifically listed the third degree felony version 
of auto homicide found in U.C.A. § 76-5-207(2). U.C.A. § 76-5-207(~) lists out 
the e_lements of auto homicide as a second degree felony. The only difference 
with§ 76-5-207(3) and§ 76-5-207(2) is the requirement of criminal negligence 
in the former verses simple negligence_in the latter. 
In the notes, the Committee took pains to emphasize the "very limited 
prosecutions" in which this instruction is used. In that note, the Committee 
did not broadly mention all of § 76-5-207, which would encompass cases 
involving criminal negligence. The MUJI Committee very specifically listed 
. . 
only§ 76-5-207(2)(c), which is one of the few cases where ordinary negligence 
is sufficient to constitute criminal conduct. 
B. The Law Regarding Criminal Negligence. 
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Under Utah law, a person acts with criminal negligence when. "he 
ought. to be aware of a . substantial . and unj,ustifiable risk that the 
circumstances exist,. or the re~ult will occur." U.C.A. § 76-2-104(4) (2003). 
"The substantial and unjustifiable risk of which a person ought to be aware 
of in a negligent homicide is death." State v. Boss, 2005 UT App. 520, ,r 11, 
127 P.3d 1236 (internal citation omitted). "The risk must be of such a nature 
and degree that failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the 
standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise in all the 
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint." U.C.A. §76-2-103(4) 
(2003) . 
. "Ordinary negligence, which is the basis for a civil action for damages, 
is not sufficient to constitute criminal negligence." State v. Larsen, 2000 UT 
App. 106, if 18, 999 P.2d 1252 (quoting State v. Warden, 784 P.2d 1204 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989).. Mere inattention or mistake in judgment is not criminal 
unless the quality of the act makes it so. Warden, 784 P.2d at 1207. Criminal 
negligence must be more than lack of ordinary care and precaution; it must 
be something more than mere inadvertence or misadventure. Larsen, 2000 UT 
App. at 118 (quoting 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law§ 136). 
C. Instructions Given By The T.rial Court. 
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The trial court provided the jury with several instructions regarding 
the concept of criminal negligence. Instruction No. 24 quoted verbatim 
U.C.A. § 76-2-103(4): 
A person acts with criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with 
respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his 
conduct when he ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable 
risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must 
be of such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes 
a gross deviation for the standard of care that an ordinary person 
would exercise in all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's 
standpoint. 
Instruction No. 36 correctly states this court's finding in Boss that "the 
substantial and unjustifiable risk of which a person ought to be aware in a 
case of negligent homicide in death." 2005 UT App. at ,r 11; R223. 
Instruction No. 27 reiterates the requirement from§ 76-2-103(4) that the 
conduct must be a "gross deviation" from the standard of care exercised by 
and ordinary person. R214. Instruction 27 further illustrates for the jury 
conduct that falls short of criminal negligence: 
"Ordinary negligence, which is the basis for a civil_action for damages, 
is not sufficient to constitute criminal negligence." Larsen, 2000 UT 
App. at~ 18; R214. 
Mere inattention or mistake in judgement resulting even in death of 
another is not criminal unless the quality of the act makes it so. 
Warden, 784 P.2d at 1207; R214. 
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Criminal negligence must be more than the lack of ordinary care and 
precaution; it must be something more than mere inadvertence or 
misadventure. Larsen, 2000 UT App. at ,r 18; R214. 
The defense claim that they were unable to have their theory clearly 
explained by the jury instructions is misplaced. Brf.Aplt.29. The defense 
argues that their theory of the case was that Mr. Holm was acting with 
simple negligence and was therefore not guilty. Id. Stated another way, the 
defense theory was that Mr. Holm's actions fell short of criminal negligence, 
so he was not guilty of negligent homicide. With a clear, thorough 
explanation of the correct law regarding criminal negligence, the jury was 
well informed of the difference between criminal negligence and ordinary 
negligence, thus allowing the defendant to assert his desired theory. 
In making his argument, defendant claims that the trial court error 
prevented the jury from "understand[ing] that although Mr. Holm's actions 
were a serious mistake in judgment and outside the ordinary standard of care, his 
actions did not rise to the level of criminal negligence." Brf.Aplt.36. 
( emphasis added). The defe:i;ise argument simply ignores the fact that the 
jury was informed "mistake in judgment" and "lack of ordinary care" do not 
rise to the level of crin1inal negligence. See Instruction No. 27. "It is not error 
to refuse a proposed insh·uction if the point is properly covered in other 
insh·uctions." Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 238; see also State v. Wilcox, 498 P.2d 357 
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(Utah 1972) (where the court found that the concepts discussed in the 
defendants instruction were covered in another instruction, and it was 
therefore inadvisable to make the instructions m9re complicated by use of 
synonyms which add little or nothing to make a term easier to understand). 
All of the concepts described in the ~efendants proposed inslTuction were 
covered and recovered in Instructions 24, 25, 26, 27 and 36. 
D. The Defendant Was Not Prejudiced. 
Defendant claims that the trial court's refusal to give the definition of 
shnple negligence should undermine this court's confidence in the outcome 
of the trial. Brf.Aplt 34-36. However, as stated above, the defense theory in 
the case was not isolated to convincing the jury that the defendant was guilty 
of simple negligence. In fact, this theory would have been inconsistent with 
the defendant's own testimony. 
The defendant took the stand and described a careful drive where he 
was not drowsy, not distracted by the radio or food, and where he was not 
in a rush to get to work. He testified that he was driving around the posted 
speed limit, that he did not speed off at the frontage road as he approached 
the intersection, and that any swerve his vehicle may have made was the 
result of a drink slipping out of the cup holder. He also testified that he had 
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his headlights on while he was driving, which is contrary to eyewitness 
testimony and the final position of his headlight switch. 
The defendant relayed to the jury a very careful approach to a very 
confusing intersection. He described how he saw a green light, that the light 
was constant and directly in front of him. He claimed that he was in fact so 
careful that he checked traffic in the intersection to insure that he indeed had 
a green light to proceed on. He even double checked the light as he passed 
through the intersection. He said that the red light was obstructed by a pole 
and a blind spot in his car. Ultimately, the defendant said he was confused at 
the lights and went through because he thought he was supposed to go. 
If the jury believed the defendant's testimony, they would not 
conclude he was even guilty of simple negligence. If the jury believed the 
defendant's account of what happened, they would believe that he was 
acting as a prudent person and that he was exercising reasonable care. 
Under the defendant's story, at best he was victiln of being unfamiliar with a 
poorly designed intersection, and at worst, he made a simple mistake after 
exercising a great degree of care. If the jury believed the defendant's 
testimony, they would have found him not guilty because he was not 
criminally negligent, not because he was "simply negligent". However, the 
jury clearly did not believe his story. 
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The defense theory in this case was that the defendant did not act .. with 
criminal ·negligence. The jury received very thorough instructions with 
regard to the applicable law in this case. As such, the court did not err in 
refusing to give the proposed definition of simple negligence. 
IV. THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE 
CONVICTION FOR NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE. 
A. The defendant failed to marshal all of the evidence supporting 
the jury's verdict. 
Defendant correctly asserts that in State v. Nielsen, our supreme court 
"repudiate[d] the default notion of marshaling." 2014 UT 10, ~41, 326 P.3d 
645. In Nielsen, the court clarified that a technical deficiency in the 
marshalling requirement would not result in a default, thus inhi~iting the 
court from proceeding on the merits. Id. at if 41. This was done in an effort 
to get the parties to focus their argument o~ the merits of the case rather than 
some deficiency in the appellant's duty of marshalling. Id. at il 42. 
However, in Nielsen, the court also made it clear that the appellate still 
has a duty to marshal the evidence for a sufficiency clahn. Id. at iJ 40. The 
court stated: "[W]e reiterate that a party challenging ... sufficiency of the 
evidence to support a verdict ~ill almost certainly fail to carry its burden of 
persuasion on appeal if it fails to marshal." Id. at ,r 42. 
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In exa1nining a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the court 
should review the record as a whole. State v. Hawkins, 2016 UT App. 9, ,r 41, 
366 P.3d 884., see also State v. McCallie, 2016 UT App. 4, if 44, 803 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 35. Thus, the court is not limited to evidence adduced during the state's 
case, but may also consider evidence produced during the defense case. 
In his brief, the defendant vastly undersold the record evidence 
supporting his conviction for Negligent Homicide. In an effort to highlight 
how the defense has failed to meet its burden of persuasion, See id. at ,r 41, 
and to aid the courts analysis of the merits of the defendants claim, the State 
lists the following facts from the record to supplement the defense 
presentation of the marshaled evidence: 
1. Bangerter Highway is a fast moving highway, with a speed of 50 
mph. R532:218. The State's accident reconstructionist testified that 
roads with greater speeds carry a greater risk of fatalities with 
crashes. R542:227. 
2. Mike and Brittney Grange testified that the defendant continued 
weaving, several times over several miles. R409:95, 412:98, 430:116-
117. Mike Grange testified that he tried to catch up to the defendant 
and at one point reached a speed of 70 mph. R411:97. Even at this 
speed, t~e defendant maintained his distance and Mr. Grange could 
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not catch up with him. R411:97. B~sed on his own speed, Mr. 
Grange estimated that the defendant may have been going close to 
90 miles per hour. R422:108. The defenda~t' s driving pattern ~as 
so concerning to the Grange's that they decided to call 911 out of 
concern for the safety of other people on the road. R410:96. The 
defendant's pattern of speeding and weaving in and out of his lanes 
continued between Parkway Blvd. and the intersection where the 
crash occurred. R434:120. Just prior to the crash, the defendant 
drifted from the left, inside lane to the right lane of travel w_here the 
crash occurred. R495:181-83, State's Exh. 22. Mr. Grange watched 
the defendant's car approach the intersection and estimated that he 
may have been traveling between 70 and 90 mph. R423:109. 
3. The accident reconstructionist could only provide a "best estimate" 
for the speed in this case. R497:183. He tried several of the 
traditional formulas for determining speed, but could not apply 
them here. He could not apply the "conservation of momentum" 
formula to this case because the crash happened and different 
angles that can affect accuracy of that formula. R498:184. He could 
not apply the "conservation of energy" formula because there were 
multiple cars involved in the collision. R499:185. He could not pull 
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the speed from the air bag control module on the defendant's car 
because this make did not provide any information that could be 
downloaded. RS00:186. With none of these primary methods for 
determining speed available, he had to give his "best estimate" 
based on prior experience. R501:187. In doing so he estimated the 
defendant was traveling at a minimum of 50 mph. 501:187. 
4. Every eyewitness who was at the scene of the crash testified that it 
was dark outside at the time of the crash. R400:86, R418:104, 
R445:131, R452:138, 140, 141, R473:159. 
5. At the time of the crash, Mr. Holm was 8 minutes late for work, and 
still had some distance to go before he arrived at his place of 
employment. R653:78,R654:79, State's Exh. 28. 
6. The defendant passed through this same intersection to and from 
work every day for two months prior to the crash. R670:94. When 
he wasn't driving, he was sitting in the front passenger seat. 
R672:96. Prior . to the crash, he had been through that same 
intersection at least 80 times, possibly more. R672:96-97. 
7. Four other witnesses, who pass through this intersection on their 
way to work, testified not only that they are not confused by the 
-35-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
intersections layout or traffic signals, b:ut that they have never been 
confused by them. R401:~7, R414:100, R436:122, R458:144. 
The defendant's II overbroad assertions in his brief regarding the 
absence of evidence in the record, and his general failure to identify and deal 
with that evidence" should certainly affect and greatly undermine his claim 
on appeal. Nielsen, 2014 UT at ,r 44. Due to this failure, the defendant has 
failed to establish II a basis for overcoming the healthy dose of deference 
owed to ... [the] jury verdict." Id. at ,r 41. 
B. There was sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction. 
When the court considers an insufficiency of the evidence claim, the 
court 11 review[s] the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be 
drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury." Id. at 
146. (quoting State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ,r 302, 299 P.3d 892 (internal 
quotations omitted)). The court may reverse a verdict "only when the 
evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable 
that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime of which he or she was convicted." Id. "So 
long as there is some evidence, including reasonable inferences, from which 
findings of all the requisite elements of the crime can reasonably be made, 
[the courts] inquiry stops." State v. Mead, 2001 UT 58, ,r 65, 27 P.3d 1115. 
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The defendant relies entirely on Larsen to argue that his conduct was 
not criminally negligent, but "can be more accurately characterized as a 
serious mistake in judgment." 2000 UT App. 106; Brf.Aplt.41. In Larsen, the 
defendant made a left turn at normal speed at an intersection and collided 
with an oncoming car which would have been visible to the defendant had 
he been looking. Id. at ~19. The court held that while the defendant's 
conduct was negligent, it was more accurately characterized as a serious 
mistake in judgment. Id. at ~ 21. However, in the case before the court, the 
defendant's repeated deviations from the standard of care are clearly 
distinguishable from the evidence in Larsen. Larsen dealt with a simple 
1niscalculation of a left turn at a red light. Here, a series of the defendant's 
actions created a perilous situation that eventually resulted in Mr. Garcia's 
de~th. Fortunately, Larsen does not represent the entire analytical framework 
of Utah negligent homicide cases. 
In Boss, the defendant was convicted of negligent homicide. 2005 UT 
App. at ,r,r 2-4. In that case, the defendant was traveling around 70 miles per 
hour on a two lane highway. The speed limit on the highway was 65 mph. 
Id. Defendant pulled into the opposing lane of travel in an attempt to _pass 
two or more cars. Id. When the defendant saw the victim's car approaching 
in the opposite direction, the defendant cut sharply back into her lane of 
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travel and lost cqntrol of her veJ_-licle, causing it to slide sideways back into 
the opposing l~ne of travel. Id. The defendant then collided with the victim's 
car causing the death of the rear passenger. Id. On appeal, the defendant 
argued that pursuant to State v. Larsen, there was insufficient evidence to 
support a conviction for negligent homicide. Id. at il 15. The court disagreed. 
The court held that the defendant's actions in Boss were 
distinguishable from the evidence in Larsen. Id. at il 15. The court found that 
the defendant's actions could "be seen as repeated deviations from the 
appropriate standard of care, each of which might result in a substantial and 
unjustifiable chance of death under the circumstances." Id. at ,r 17. 2 
The evidence in this case is similar to the evidence in Boss. The 
defendant was traveling on a fast moving highway, which creates a greater 
risk of death in the event of a crash. The defendant blew through a red light 
that was clearly visible in an intersection he was very familiar with. He was 
2 See also State v. Warden, 813 P.2d 1146 (Utah 1991)(upholding a jury 
conviction for negligent homicide, finding that in a doctor's treatment of a 
premature newborn, there was evidence of repeated deviations from the 
standard of care and a wide divergence from the appropriate level of care, 
which created a significant risk of death) and State v. Hallett, 619 P.2. 335, 338 
(Utah 1980)(upholding a negligent homicide conviction for removing a stop 
sign because the defendant should have known that the removal of a stop 
sign created special hazards with possible fatal consequences.). 
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driving erratically and weaving in and. out of his lanes. The defendant even 
drifted from the left lane into the right lane in the middle of the intersection 
at the point of impact. Contrary to the defense claim, the defendant's speed 
was a contested -issue at trial. There was believable evidence that he may 
have been traveling well over the posted speed limit at the time of the crash, 
and that evidence must be viewed in a light favorable to the jury's verdict. 
The defendant's driving pattern was so erratic that independent witnesses 
thought they should call the police out of concern for the safety of others on 
the road. This pattern continued until the time of the crash. 
In Larsen, the court held that there was no causal connection between 
the absence of headlights and the crash. Larsen, 2000 UT App. at ,r 22. 
However, in Larsen it was still light outside at the time of the crash. Id. at ,r 6. 
Unlike the facts of Larsen, in this case it was dark outside at the time of the 
crash. The defendant did not have his headlights on as he traveled down the 
highway and into the intersection. None of the witnesses traveling along-
side the Honda saw the defendant coming into the intersection. Without 
seeing him, no one in that lane, including the driver of the victim's car, could 
stop, swerve, or do anything to avoid the collision. They were not looking 
for him because he was not supposed to be there .. They did not see him 
because he was hidden. 
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The risks created by the defendant's violation of multiple traffic rules 
ought to have been known. Boss, 2005 UT App. at ,r 19. His repeated 
deviations from the standard of care, each of which might result in a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk of death, are "indicative of criminal 
negligence as opposed to mere inatte,ntion or mistake in judgment." Id. 
When taken together, there was clearly more than sufficient evidence for the 
jury to reasonably find that the defendant's failure to perceive the risks 
created by his conduct was a gross deviation from the standard of care an 
ordinary person would exercise. U.C.A. § 76-2-103(4). As such, the 
defendant has failed to show that the evidence was "sufficiently inconclusive 
or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of the crime from which [he] 
was co.nvicted." Nielsen, 2014 UT at il 30. 
V. CUMULATIVE ERROR DOES NOT JUSTIFY 
OVERTURNING THE VERDICT. 
Defendant asserts that "all of the identified errors" as well as "any 
other errors· this Court assumes may have occurred" should undermine this 
court's confidence in a fair trial. Aplt. Br. 41. An appellate court reverses on 
cumulative error only if errors are so pervasive and prejudicial that they 
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"undermine[] [this Court's] confidence" in the essential fairness of the trial. 
Maestas, 2012 UT at ,I 363. 
But any errors, alleged or acknowledged, even if taken together, did 
not affect the fundamental fairness of the trial. The State presented ample 
evidence to prove Defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Section 
IV. Even if the trial was not perfect, it was fair. That is all the Constitution 
requires. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986) (" As we have 
stressed on more than one occasion, the Constitution entitles a criminal 
defendant to a fair trial, not a perfect one."); State v. Lamorie, 610 P.2d 342, 348 
(Utah 1980) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("Like all human endeavors, trials are 
rarely if ever conducted without at least some arguable error."). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted May 19, 2016. 
SIM GILL 
Salt Lake District Attorney 
PITTEL 
Deputy District Attorney 
Counsel for Appellee 
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1 disagree with the law as I state it. 
2 Do any of you feel you would have trouble doing that? 
3 If so, please raise your number. No numbers are raised. 
4 I'm going to ask if anybody here has ever been 
5 involved in a serious car accident. Let's go by rows. No. 8. 
6 Anybody on the second row? Number 13, No. 17. 
7 Anybody -- number 22, 20. What's your number? 
8 PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Five. 
9 PROSPECTIVE JUROR: I have a question. 
10 THE COURT: All right. 
11 PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Do you mean me personally or 
12 somebody really close to you? 
13 THE COURT: Let's stick with you personally. 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Then no. 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Twenty-eight. 
14 
15 






Okay. We will come back to that later. 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR: One more. Sorry. 
THE COURT: Twenty-one. 31 I have already. All 
22 If you are chosen as a juror, you must base your 
23 verdict solely on the evidence provided by the witness who 
24 testify in this case and on any documents or other physical 
25 evidence received. 
Noteworthy Reporting, LLC (801) 634-5549 39 
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1 Do any of you feel that you would have trouble doing 
2 that? If so, please raise your number. In other words, you 
3 don't get to go to [inaudible] on research. No numbers raised. 
4 As jurors, you must have an open mind free from any 
5 prejudices related to the case or the parties. If any of you 
6 have any questions in your mind about your ability to return a 
7 verdict of guilty or not guilty based solely on the evidence 
8 presented, in other words free from outside influences or 
9 biases, please raise your number. Okay. This is you can't 
10 take your personal stuff. You have to choose or decide this 
11 case based just on the evidence you hear, not on what's 
12 happened in your own lives. Does anyone have a problem with 
13 that? No numbers raised. No numbers raised. 
14 Do any of you have difficulty sitting in judgment, 
15 whether it's for anxiety, religious, moral, whatever reasons? 
16 If so, please raise your numbers. No .. [inaudible] Anybody 









MR. SORENSON: Twenty-nine. 
THE COURT: What? 
MR. SORENSON: Twenty-nine is [inaudible) 
THE COURT: Twenty-nine. 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Actually one more. 
THE COURT: And 22. 
All right. Let's see. Can I have counsel approach? 
(Discussion held at sidebar.) 
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1 THE COURT: Any other questions before I send them 
2 out and we talk about who we want to talk to one on one? 
3 MR. SORENSON: Could you ask if anyone close to you 
4 has been involved in a serious car accident? 
5 THE COURT: So you want that too? You know that's 
6 going to be everybody. Everybody has been in a car accident. 
7 Why talk to all these people when 
8 MR. LEAVITT: I would suggest as far as the people 
9 who have been in a car accident, I think that everyone 
10 generally could just ask would that experience affect your 
11 ability to be fair and impartial. 
12 THE COURT: Okay. 
13 MR. LEAVITT: And that may save the time to bring 
14 everyone back. 
15 THE COURT: Then we'll only bring back the ones who 





MR. SORENSON: And I would like to talk to everybody, 
THE COURT: I'm sure you would. Okay. 
Then we are going to expand that to anybody close to 
21 you who has been involved in a serious car accident. 
22 
23 
Front row. No. 1 and No. 10 and No. 9 and No. 6. 
Second row? Thirteen. We've already got. Fifteen. 
24 Anybody else? I can't see your number. Eighteen. 
25 PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Eighteen. 
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1 THE COURT: Third row? Twenty-three, 24 and 26 I've 
2 got already. 
3 Let's see anybody on that back row? Thirty-two. 
4 Yeah, I've already got 31. 
5 All right. Those of you that have been or know 
6 somebody close to you that has been in a car accident, is there 
7 anything about that experience that makes you feel like you 
8 might be biased for one side or the other? 
9 No. 1 first. Anyone else on the front row? No. 2 
10 okay, 13. On the second row 17. Anybody else on the second 
11 row? 
12 Third row? Twenty-six. 
13 Back row? 
14 All right. What we're going to do now is speak to 
15 you one on one about some of the questions that I left hanging. 
16 So we're going to ask you to follow the bailiff and do what he 




THE BAILIFF: All right. We're going to be exiting 
except for No. 1. 
THE COURT: Follow him. 





(Discussion held at sidebar.) 
THE COURT: Okay. We have [inaudible] 
MR. SORENSON: And Defense has no objection to 
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THE COURT: I note she has problems 
MR. LEAVITT: She's been sitting in judgment. 
THE COURT: -- childcare. 
MR. LEAVITT: That's fine. 
THE COURT: Issues [inaudible] sitting in judgment. 
MR. SORENSON: No objection to striking her. 
THE COURT: Do you have a problem? 
MR. LEAVITT: No, it's fine. 
MR. SORENSON: She has nine kids. 
THE COURT: [inaudible] okay. So that's 19 and 22 
[inaudible] 
MR. SORENSON: Did 29 say they can't judge? 
THE COURT: They have difficulty sitting in judgment. 
MR. SORENSON: And Defense would move to strike 29. 
MR. LEAVITT: Let's wait and see if we can get there. 
17 They may not be in the play. 
18 THE COURT: [inaudible] find somebody guilty. If 






MR. LEAVITT: Actually that's fine. That's fine. 
THE COURT: [inaudible] 
MR. LEAVITT: That's okay. 
THE COURT: The reason being is I've had people 
[inaudible] before deliberations have even started for one of 
25 them. 
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1 MR. SORENSON: And Defense would also move to strike 
2 No. 11. She's the one that has to take care of her 90 year old 
3 mother. I think she said on Wednesdays. 
4 THE COURT: Thursdays. Tuesdays and Thursdays. So 
5 she's probably got somebody else there now. 
6 MR. LEAVITT: Let's wait on that one to make sure we 
7 have enough. 
8 THE COURT: Okay. 
9 MR. LEAVITT: And if we're fine, I don't have a 
10 problem with that. I just don't want to run out of jurors 
11 because that's we [inaudible] first day so. 
12 THE COURT: All right. [inaudible] 
13 MR. SORENSON: Just so I know, are we going 
14 THE COURT: We're going to start to bring them in one 
15 at a time. 
16 




MR. LEAVITT: Right. We're going to bring back the 
far as -- a million car accidents as far as bias 
THE COURT: I don't think that's going to be a 
MR. SORENSON: And is the record on? Just for the 
21 benefit of the record, I would like to talk with every single 
22 person who raised their hand. Either they were involved in a 
23 serious car accident or a close friend was involved in a 
24 serious car accident just to know the circumstances, what 
25 happened. 
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1 
2 
THE COURT: Isn't it that case asking cars 
[inaudible] every single person is going to go yes. And are 
3 you going to talk to every single one of them? They not 
4 when they've -- when they've said it's going to cause a problem 
5 for them? [inaudible] 
6 MR. LEAVITT: My position is that your question of 
7 would it create a bias, you can overcome, we rehabilitate 
8 everybody except for those [inaudible] I think they've been 
9 rehabilitated. 
10 MR. SORENSON: And I don't -- I would like to talk to 
11 them, but I understand the Court's ruling. 
12 THE COURT: We'll start with No. 1, who's had the 
13 benefit of listening to some of the things that lawyers do. 
14 You mentioned that you have been involved in a 
15 serious car accident or someone close to you and you worried it 
16 could cause bias. Could you tell us about that? 
17 PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Well, I work in a life insurance 
18 business, so I have several clients and I train financial 
19 planners who sell the products. So we have a lot of stories of 
20 in our industry of people who have lost ones in car accidents. 
21 And we try to do our best to protect those individuals who, you 
22 know, lose a loved one. 
23 THE COURT: Okay. Well, then you know sometimes when 
24 car accidents happen, there is fault and it can go in all 
25 directions; isn't that correct? 
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1 
2 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Yes. 
THE COURT: He's nodding yes. So having not heard 
3 the facts of this case, do you think you could make a decision 
4 involving this case based only on the facts you hear, not on 


















PROSPECTIVE JUROR: I would like to be able to. 
THE COURT: Are you confident that you could or not? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Um, I'm not confident. 
THE COURT: Okay. Any questions from counsel? 
MR. LEAVITT: No. 
MR. SORENSON: No. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
Okay. Any motions as to No. l? 
MR. SORENSON: The Defense would move to strike at 
MR. LEAVITT: No objection. 
THE COURT: No. 1 is out for cause. 
No. 13. 
MR. LEAVITT: I might know No. 6. 
THE COURT: Oh. Bring No. 6 in. 
MR. LEAVITT: So could we bring him .in? I could ask 
22 him where he's from, if it's the same guy. 
23 
2 4 you from? 
25 
THE COURT: Just grab an end seat there. Where are 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Herriman. Well, I live in 
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1 Herriman. I'm from Box Elder County actually. 
2 THE COURT: Okay. One of our counsel thinks they may 






MR. LEAVITT: Casey Roche is your brother? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Casey is my younger brother, yes. 
MR. LEAVITT: Casey [inaudible] 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Yeah, I know Casey well. 
THE COURT: Okay. That takes care. Oh, well, you 
9 had a car accident. Tell us about that. 
10 PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Well, which one? My spouse, 
11 Mindy, was in a car wreck that totaled her car. No injuries 
12 really. 
13 THE COURT: That's good. 
14 PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Biggest pet peeve in the world. 
15 Really somebody stopped in traffic and she went over one, two 
16 lanes onto oncoming traffic. 
17 THE COURT: Oh, no. That's a no, no. So it was her 
18 fault? 
19 PROSPECTIVE JUROR: It was her fault. And she didn't 
20 think it was. And I had to explain, yeah, it's your fault. 
21 THE COURT: Oh, okay. 
22 PROSPECTIVE JUROR: And then my mom was in a car 
23 wrecked her Jeep in Ogden, just rear ended at a stop sign. 
24 Somebody just behind her didn't slow down and totaled her Jeep, 
25 but ... 
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1 THE COURT: Are there anything about those accidents 
2 that you think might make you feel biased one way or another in 




PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Accidents happen. I mean --
THE COURT: Okay. 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR: They're -- unfortunately they're 







THE COURT: Okay. Any other questions from counsel? 
MR. LEAVITT: No. 
MR. SORENSON: No. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR: You bet. 
MR. SORENSON: Defense would move to strike based on 
14 the familiarity. <tJ 
15 MR. LEAVITT: That's fine. 




Any seat is fine. So you mentioned having been 
19 involved in a car crash or someone close to you. Can you tell 
20 us about that? 
21 PROSPECTIVE JUROR: About five or six years ago my 
22 mother-in-law was killed by a drunk driver. 
23 THE COURT: Okay. Anything about that case that you 
24 feel would make you biased in this one, or could you judge this 
25 by the facts that you hear just in this case? 
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1 PROSPECTIVE JUROR: I think I could judge it based on 
2 the evidence. 
3 THE COURT: And you would be able to put your 
4 personal experiences aside? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR: I would do my best. 
THE COURT: Any questions from counsel? 
5 
6 
7 MR. SORENSON: If I may. It sounds like you'd do 
8 your best, but do you honestly think -- I mean, it sounds like 
9 a tragic experience. Do you think you could give him a fair 
10 trial? And I understand you'd do your best, but are you 
11 confident about it? 
12 PROSPECTIVE JUROR: I think so, yes. 
13 MR. SORENSON: Okay. 
MR. LEAVITT: Okay. Thanks. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
14 
15 




THE BAILIFF: 17? 
THE COURT: Seventeen. 
20 All right. You mentioned you or someone close to you 
21 being involved in a serious car accident. Tell us about that. 
22 PROSPECTIVE JUROR: It's 32 years ago. I was turning 
23 left and someone hit me as they went through a red light. And 
24 I was due to deliver our baby the next week, so I was nine 
25 months pregnant and the baby died. And I was in serious 
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JURY INSTRUCTION NO._~ 
A person engages in conduct intentionally with respect to the nature of his conduct, or to 
a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or 
cause the result. 
A person engages in conduct knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct 
or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or the 
existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of 
his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. 
A person engages in conduct recklessly with respect to the circumstances surrounding his 
conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial 
and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of 
such a nature and degree that is disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care 
that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circwnstances as viewed from the actor's 
standpoint. 
A person acts with criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he ought to be aware of 
a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk 
must be of a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from 
the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise in all the circumstances as viewed 
from the actor's standpoint. 
"Conduct" means either an act or an omission. 
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JURY ThTSTRUCTION NO~ 
If acting with criminal negligence is sufficient to establish the culpable mental 
state for an element of an offense, that element is also established if a person acts intentionally 
knowingly or recklessly. 
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JURY INSTRUCTION ):_f:::, 
To establish criminal negligence, it is necessary to show conduct which is a gross 
deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise in all the 
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standard. It is therefore a subjective element requiring 
consideration of all relevant circumstances surrounding the incident. Negligent homicide 
involves the defendant's perception of risk and necessarily requires an evaluation of his or her 
state of mind. 
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JURY INSTRUCTION NO. J, 1 
Conduct is not criminally negligent unless it constitutes a "gross deviation" from the 
standard of care exercised by an ordinary person. Ordinary negligence, which is the basis for a 
civil action for damages, is not sufficient to constitute criminal negligence. Mere inattention or 
mistake in judgment resulting even in death of another is not criminal unless the quality of the 
act makes it so. Criminal negligence must be more than the lack of ordinary care and precaution; 
it must be something more than mere inadvertence or misadventure. 
00214 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
@ 
@ 
JURY INSTRUCTION 3.__b 
The substantial and unjustifiable "risk of which a person ought to be aware in a case of 
negligent homicide is death.· 
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The Fourth District, Provo Department (Utah) convicted 
defendant of negligent homicide, a class A 
misdemeanor, under Utah Code Ann.§ 76-5-206 (2003). 
Overview 
Defendant caused an automobile collision in which a 
child was killed. At issue on appeal was whether there 
was sufficient evidence to support defendant's 
conviction of negligent homicide with regard to the 
elements of: (1) criminal negligence; and, (2) causation. 
Her attempt to pass two or more cars on a two-lane 
highway, in the face of oncoming traffic, at a speed of70 
miles per hour--followed by a sharp, over-correcting 
lane transition causing loss of vehicle control--created a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk of death. Her actions 
were repeated deviations from the appropriate standard 
of care, each of which might have resulted in a 
substantial and unjustifiable chance of death. Her 
conduct was indicative of criminal negligence as 
opposed to mere inattention or a mistake in judgment. 
Second, she argued that the State did not establish that 
her conduct caused the death of the child. Her conduct 
created a condition of peril, which led to a substantial 
risk of death, and therefore, a jury could have properly 
found her conduct to be the proximate cause of the 
resulting collision. 
Outcome 
The judgment was affirmed. 
LexisNexis® Headnotes 
Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Standards of Review > 
Substantial Evidence > General Overview 
Evidence > Inferences & Presumptions > Inferences 
Evidence > Burdens of Proof> Proof Beyond Reasonable 
Doubt 
HN1 In reviewing sufficiency of the evidence claims, 
appellate courts reverse a jury verdict only when the 
evidence is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt. They examine the 
evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict. So long 
as there is some evidence, including reasonable 
inferences, from which findings of all the requisite 
elements of the crime can reasonably be made, their 
inquiry stops. 
Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Homicide, Manslaughter 
& Murder> Involuntary Manslaughter> General Overview 
Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Acts & Mental States > 
Mens Rea > Negligence 
HN2 Under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-206(1 J (2003), 
criminal homicide constitutes negligent homicide if the 
actor, acting with criminal negligence, causes the death 
of another. 
Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Acts & Mental States > 
Mens Rea > Negligence 
Torts > ... > Duty > Standards of Care > General Overview 
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HN3 Under Utah law, a person acts with criminal 
negligence when she ought to be aware of a substantial 
and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the 
result will occur. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103{4) (2003). 
The substantial and unjustifiable risk of which a person 
ought to be aware in a case of negligent homicide is 
death. According to the Utah Code, the risk must be of 
such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it 
constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care 
that an ordinary person would exercise in all the 
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
Utah Code Ann.§ 76-2-103(4}. 
Criminal Law & Procedure> ... > Acts & Mental States> 
Mens Rea > Negligence 
HN4 Notably, ordinary negligence is not sufficient to 
constitute criminal negligence. Mere inattention or 
mistake in judgment resulting even in death of another 
is not criminal unless the quality of the act makes it so. 
Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Acts & Mental States > 
Mens Rea > Negligence 
Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Acts & Mental States > 
Mens Rea > Recklessness 
Torts > Negligence > General Overview 
HN5 Criminal negligence, like recklessness, and unlike 
ordinary negligence, requires a gross deviation from 
the applicable standard of care. The risk of death 
required for recklessness and for criminally negligent 
conduct is the same; the only difference between the 
two is whether the defendant was aware of that risk. 
Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Acts & Mental States > 
Mens Rea > Negligence 
HN6 Criminal negligence requires a causal connection 
between defendant's actions and the ultimate result. 
Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Acts & Mental States > 
Mens Rea > Negligence 
Torts > ... > Causation > Proximate Cause > General 
Overview 
HN7 Where a party by his wrongful conduct creates a 
condition of peril, his action can properly be found to be 
the proximate cause of a resulting injury, even though 
later events that combined to cause the injury may also 
be classified as negligent, so long as the latter act is 
something which can reasonably be expected to follow 
in the natural sequence of events. 
Counsel: Shelden R. Carter, Provo, for Appellant. 
Tim Taylor, Provo, for Appellee. 
Judges: Judith M. Billings, Presiding Judge. WE 
CONCUR: James Z. Davis, Judge, Carolyn B. McHugh, 
Judge. 
Opinion by: Judith M. Billings 
Opinion 
[*"'1237] BILLINGS, Presiding Judge: 
rP1] Defendant Dorothy Nanette Boss appeals from a 
jury conviction of negligent homicide, a class A 
misdemeanor, under Utah Code section 76-5-206. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-206 (2003). On appeal, 
Defendant argues there was insufficient evidence to 
support a conviction of negligent homicide, because 
Defendant's conduct (1) did not rise to the level of 
criminal negligence and (2) was not the proximate cause 
of the collision. We affirm Defendant's conviction. 
BACKGROUND 
rP2] On September 17, 2003, Defendant was driving 
westbound on Highway 73, a two-lane highway, near 
Saratoga Springs, Utah. Wendell Roy Hathaway 
(Hathaway) was driving eastbound on Highway 73 with 
his family when he saw Defendant pull out of the 
westbound lane of traffic into the [*"""2] eastbound lane 
in an attempt to pass two or more cars. Noting 
Defendant's approach in the eastbound lane, Hathaway 
slowed down and began to pull off onto the south side of 
the road. Hathaway then saw Defendant's car cut 
sharply back into the westbound lane directly behind a 
westbound dump truck and, within seconds, return into 
the eastbound lane, sliding sideways on the driver's 
side of the car. Defendant's car hit the Hathaway car, 
which at the time of impact was at the far side of the 
eastbound lane. Jaycee Hathaway, Hathaway's 
four-year-old daughter, was sitting in a car seat on the 
back driver's side when the impact occurred. She 
suffered severe head trauma and died later that day 
from her injuries. Besides Hathaway and his family, 
there were no other witnesses to the accident. 
(*P3] Deputy Ray Edwards (Officer Edwards) 
investigated the scene of the accident. Initially, no one 
informed Officer Edwards that Defendant's vehicle 
emerged from the westbound lane on its side before 
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hitting Hathaway's car. As a result, Officer Edwards did 
not collect any physical evidence indicating what caused 
Defendant's car to enter the eastbound lane on its side. 
At trial, Officer Edwards testified r-31 that aggressive 
steering combined with speed could lift a car sideways 
onto two wheels. Officer Edwards also stated that a 
particular driveway, located on the west shoulder of 
Highway 73, could have acted as a ramp, lifting 
Defendant's car onto two wheels if Defendant had hit it. 
[*P4] Deputy Susan Morgan (Officer Morgan), the 
officer who first responded to the accident, testified that 
Defendant said she was traveling at seventy miles per 
hour at the time of the accident. The speed limit in the 
area was sixty-five miles per hour. 
[*PS] Gregory Du Val {Du Val), an expert witness hired 
by the State to reconstruct the accident, testified that in 
order for Defendant's car to roll onto the driver's side 
and slide into the eastbound lane, it must have left the 
paved roadway and hit a ramp or some other lifting 
mechanism. Du Val stated that this mechanism was 
likely the driveway identified by Officer Edwards. Du Val 
further testified that to reach the driveway, Defendant 
would have had to steer aggressively with a force 
beyond what would normally have been needed to 
return her car to c-1238] the westbound lane of traffic. 
Du Val opined that the use of such force was negligent. 
rPs] r**4] Dennis Andrews (Andrews), another expert 
witness in accident reconstruction for the State, testified 
that he was unable to identify what caused Defendant's 
car to roll on its side and that no preimpact speeds could 
be calculated. Andrews also testified that, although he 
could not speculate as to whether Defendant's specific 
actions, causing her car to move back into the 
eastbound lane, were negligent. her overall actions 
were negligent. 
[*P7] At the conclusion of the trial, the trial judge 
instructed the jury that 
a vehicle may not be operated on the left side of the 
center of the roadway in overtaking and passing 
another vehicle proceeding in the same direction 
unless the left side is clearly visible and is free of 
oncoming traffic for a sufficient distance to permit 
overtaking and passing to be completed without 
interfering with the operation of any vehicle 
approaching from the opposite direction of any 
vehicle overtaken. 
[*PS] The jury found Defendant guilty of negligent 
homicide. Defendant appeals. 
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
rP9] At issue on appeal is whether there was sufficient 
evidence to support Defendant's conviction of negligent 
homicide with r-s1 regard to the elements of (1) 
criminal negligence and (2) causation. HN1 In reviewing 
sufficiency of the evidence claims, we reverse a jury 
verdict only when the evidence "is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable 
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt." 
State v. Mead. 2001 UT 58, P65. 27 P.3d 1115 
(quotations and citations omitted). We examine the 
evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict. See 
State v. Hamilton. 2003 UT 22. P18. 70 P.3d 111. "So 
long as there is some evidence, including reasonable 
inferences, from which findings of all the requisite 
elements of the crime can reasonably be made, our 
inquiry stops." Mead. 2001 UT 58 at P67 (quotations 
and citation omitted). 
ANALYSIS 
[*P1 O] Defendant argues there was insufficient 
evidence to support her conviction of negligent 
homicide, under Utah Code section 76-5-206(1 L where 
Defendant's conduct (1) did not rise to the level of 
criminal negligence and (2) was not the proximate cause 
of the collision. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-206(1 J. 
HN2 Under section 76-5-206(1 ), "criminal homicide 
constitutes negligent homicide [*"*6] if the actor, acting 
with criminal negligence, causes the death of another." 
Id. 
I. Criminal Negligence 
[*P11] First, Defendant argues that her actions did not 
amount to criminal negligence. HN3 Under Utah law, a 
person acts with criminal negligence when "she ought 
to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that 
the circumstances exist or the result will occur." Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-2-103(4) (2003). The substantial and 
unjustifiable risk of which a person ought to be aware in 
a case of negligent homicide is death. See State v. 
Standiford, 769 P.2d 254. 267 /Utah 1988). According 
to the Utah Code, "the risk must be of such a nature and 
degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross 
deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary 
person would exercise in all the circumstances as 
viewed from the actor's standpoint." Utah Code Ann. § 
76-2-103(4). 
[*P12] HN4 Notably, "ordinary negligence ... is not 
sufficient to constitute criminal negligence." State v. 
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Larsen. 2000 UT App 106. P18. 999 P.2d 1252 
(quotations and citation omitted). 111Mere inattention or 
mistake in r-"7] judgment resulting even in death of 
another is not criminal unless the quality of the act 
makes it so."' Id. (quoting State v. Warden. 784 P.2d 
1204. 1207 /Utah Ct. App. 1989)). 
rP13] Defendant contends the case of State v. Larsen 
is factually similar to our case here. See 999 P. 2d 1252. 
2000 UT App 106. In that case, the defendant made a 
left turn at normal speed at an intersection and collided 
with an oncoming car, which would have been visible to 
the defendant had he been looking. See id. at P19. In 
Larsen, the oncoming car clearly had the right of way, 
[*"'1239] and the defendant had a small amount of 
alcohol in his system. See id. One of the passengers in 
the oncoming car was killed as a result of the collision, 
and the defendant was convicted of negligent homicide. 
See id. at PP7-8. The defendant challenged the 
sufficiency of the evidence on appeal. See id. at P15. 
On appeal, we held that while the defendant's conduct 
was negligent, it was not a gross deviation from the 
standard of care. See id. at P24. 
[*P14] Defendant, citing language from Larsen, argues 
that her conduct was not criminally negligent because it 
did not [***8] amount to recklessness or an indifference 
incompatible with a proper regard for human life. 1 
However, we agree with the State that the "reckless" 
and "indifferent" language we employed in Larsen is 
unfortunate and should not be read to substitute 
recklessness for the relevant standard set forth in sec-
tion 76-2-103/4). 2 -
[*P15] [***9] Defendant maintains that like the 
defendant's conduct in Larsen, her actions were not 
criminally negligent, but rather represented a serious 
mistake in judgment. However, unlike the evidence in 
Larsen, here there was testimony revealing Defendant's 
excessive speed and aggressive steering when she 
attempted to return her car to the right side of the road 
after passing. We simply cannot conclude that no 
reasonable juror could find that Defendant's attempt to 
pass two or more cars on a two-lane highway, in the 
face of oncoming traffic, at a speed of seventy miles per 
hour-followed by a sharp, overcorrecting lane transition 
causing loss of vehicle control--created a substantial 
and unjustifiable risk of death. 
[*P16] Although there are no Utah negligent homicide 
cases factually on point with the present case, the 
analytical framework of Utah negligent homicide cases 
supports our decision to affirm the jury's verdict in the 
instant case. In State v. Warden. 813 P.2d 1146 (Utah 
1991). the Utah Supreme Court reversed a decision by 
the court of appeals and upheld a doctor's jury conviction 
for negligent homicide of a newborn where the doctor 
failed [***10) to monitor the condition of the premature 
newborn, despite knowing the baby suffered from a 
respiratory condition; inform the newborn's parents of 
the gravity of the baby's condition; and hospitalize the 
baby. See id. at 1151-52. The court stated, "There was 
evidence of repeated deviations from the standard of 
1 In State v. Larsen. 2000 UT App 106. 999 P.2d 1252, we stated: 
The facts presented at trial do not indicate that defendant's actions were undertaken recklessly or with an 
indifference to human life, nor does the quality of defendant's act lead to the conclusion that his actions were 
criminal. Rather, defendant simply failed to see an oncoming car which was visible to other drivers as he made a 
left turn, with tragic consequences. 
Id. at P21. 
2 Compare Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(3) (2003) (stating persons act recklessly when they are "aware of but consciously 
disregard[] a substantial and unjustifiable risk" ( emphasis added)), with id. § 76-2-103( 4) ( stating that persons act with criminal 
negligence when they "ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will 
occur" (emphasis added)). HN5 Criminal negligence, like recklessness, and unlike ordinary negligence, requires a gross 
deviation from the applicable standard of care. See State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254. 267 (Utah 1988} (comparing and 
contrasting reckless manslaughter with negligent homicide). The risk of death required for recklessness and for criminally 
negligent conduct is the same; the only difference between the two is whether the defendant was aware of that risk. See id.; see 
also State v. Ontiveros, 835 P.2d 201. 206 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (describing the distinction between reckless manslaughter and 
negligent homicide as whether person perceives risk of death, not degree of perception of risk). Therefore, despite the Larsen 
court's reference to recklessness, our decision in that case was correct, because it hinged upon the court's determination that 
the evidence was insufficient to show beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant's conduct constituted a gross deviation from 
the standard of care. See Larsen. 2000 UT App 106 at P27. 
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care, a wide divergence between the appropriate level 
of care and the care actually received, [and] a significant 
chance of death .... " Id. at 1152 (emphasis added). 
rP17] Here, like the doctor's separate actions in 
Warden, Defendant's speeding, passing a line of 
vehicles in the face of oncoming traffic, and making a 
sharp, overcorrecting lane transition, may be seen as 
repeated deviations from the appropriate standard of 
care, each of which might result in a substantial [*1240] 
and unjustifiable chance of death under the 
circumstances. 
[*P18] Also, in State v. Hallett. 619 P.2d 335 (Utah 
1980), the defendant was convicted of negligent 
homicide when he took a stop sign down, which later 
caused a car to collide with another car at an 
intersection. See id. at 337. The defendant appealed 
r**11] based, in part, upon a sufficiency of the evidence 
claim. See id. at 338. The Utah Supreme Court upheld 
the lower court's conviction where the evidence 
established the defendant 
Id. 
could not fail to know that stop signs are placed at 
particular intersections where they are deemed to 
be necessary because of special hazards; and that 
without the stop sign, the hazards which caused it 
to be placed there would exist; and that he should 
have foreseen that its removal would result in setting 
a trap fraught with danger and possible fatal 
consequences to others. 
[*P19] In this case, Defendant's violation of traffic rules 
was tantamount to the actions of the defendant in the 
Hallet case, both in terms of the risks created and that 
the hazards of violating multiple traffic rules ought to 
have been known. Defendant's conduct is ultimately 
indicative of criminal negligence as opposed to mere 
inattention or a mistake in judgment. 
[*P20] Additionally, there is persuasive authority from 
other jurisdictions, with statutory standards similar to 
ours, that support the proposition that improper attempts 
to pass, combined with speed, can meet the [***12] 
substantial and unjustifiable risk or gross deviation 
standard. In State v. Wall. 481 N.W2d 259 (S.D. 1992). 
the defendant was convicted of involuntary or reckless 
manslaughter when, while driving at a high speed, 
ducking in and out of lanes, and attempting to pass 
multiple cars in one lengthy pass, she ran into a pickup. 
See id. at 261-62. The defendant appealed based on 
insufficiency of the evidence, and the South Dakota 
Supreme Court upheld the lower court's decision. See 
id. at 263. Similarly, in State v. Wilcoxon. 639 So. 2d 385 
{La. Ct. App. 1994). the defendant was convicted of 
negligent homicide when, driving over seventy miles 
per hour, defendant attempted a pass uphill and around 
a curve marked as a no-passing zone and, despite 
applying his brakes, collided with an oncoming car. See 
id. at 387. The defendant appealed based on 
insufficiency of the evidence, but the court of appeals 
upheld the lower court's conviction. See id. at 389. 
[*P21] In summary, Defendant has failed to persuade 
this court that the evidence in the instant case was so 
inconclusive that reasonable [***13] minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that Defendant was 
guilty of negligent homicide. 
II. Causation 
[*P22] Second, Defendant argues that the State did not 
establish that her conduct caused the death of the child. 
Specifically, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the 
evidence regarding the particular mechanism that 
caused Defendant's car to lift, roll onto its side, cross 
the lane, and collide with the Hathaway car. HN6 
Criminal negligence "requires a causal connection 
between defendant's actions and the ultimate result." 
State v. Larsen. 2000 UT App 106. P20. 999 P.2d 1252. 
[*P23] In State v. Hallett, 619 P.2d 335 {Utah 1980), the 
Utah Supreme Court found the defendant's removal of 
a stop sign to be a gross deviation from the standard of 
care, which created a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk. The defendant in 
Hallet claimed that he was not the proximate cause 
of the resulting death because there was evidence 
that one of the vehicles, which subsequently collided 
at the intersection, was speeding. See id. at 338. In 
response to the defendant's contention, the Utah 
Supreme Court stated that 
HN7 where [***14] a party by his wrongful 
conduct creates a condition of peril, his action 
can properly be found to be the proximate 
cause of a resulting injury, even though later 
events [that] combined to cause the injury may 
also be classified as negligent, so long as the 
latter act is something which can reasonably be 
expected to follow in the natural sequence of 
events. 
Id. at 339. 
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[*P24] In this case, there was testimony at trial that a 
specific driveway, adjacent to the [**1241] road where 
the accident occurred, was the mechanism that, 
combined with Defendant's conduct, likely caused the 
fatal collision. Both Officer Edwards and expert witness 
Du Val, an accident reconstructionist, identified the 
driveway on the shoulder of the road as the probable 
lifting mechanism that contributed to Defendant's car 
reentering the eastbound lane on its side. 
that Defendant's conduct caused the collision was so 
"inconclusive or inherently improbable" that reasonable 
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt. State 
v. Mead, 2001 UT 58, P65. 27 P.3d 1115 (quotations 
and citations omitted). 
CONCLUSION 
[*P26] We conclude that the evidence presented to the 
jury was sufficient to support Defendant's conviction of 
[*P25] However, the jury could reasonably conclude it negligent homicide. we therefore affirm Defendant's 
was Defendant's conduct that caused her to lose control conviction. 
of her vehicle, and ultimately crash into the oncoming 
vehicle. Defendant attempted to pass two or more cars Judith M. Billings, 
on a two-lane highway, in the face of oncoming traffic, at 
a speed of seventy miles per hour, subsequently c--1s1 Presiding Judge 
making a sharp, overcorrecting lane transition, which 
likely caused her car to hit the driveway. Like the (*P27] WE CONCUR: 
defendant's conduct in Hallett, Defendant's conduct 
created a condition of peril, which led to a substantial James Z. Davis, Judge 
risk of death, and therefore, a jury could have properly 
found Defendant's conduct to be the proximate cause of Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge 
the resulting collision. Thus, we cannot say the evidence 
Peter Leavitt 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
AddendumD 
A ddendumD Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Utah Code 
76-5-207 Automobile homicide. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Drug" or "drugs" means: 
{i) a controlled substance as defined in Section 58-37-2; 
~ {ii) a drug as defined in Section 58-1?b-102; or 
{iii) any substance that, when knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly taken into the human body, 
can impair the ability of a person to safely operate a motor vehicle. 
(b) "Motor vehicle" means any self-propelled vehicle and includes any automobile, truck, van, 
motorcycle, train, engine, watercraft, or aircraft. 
~ (2) 
{a) Criminal homicide is automobile homicide, a third degree felony, if the person operates a 
motor vehicle in a negligent manner causing the death of another and: 
{i) has sufficient alcohol in his body that a subsequent chemical test shows that the person has 
a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of the test; 
i.JP {ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and any 
drug to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely operating a vehicle; or 
{iii) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of operation. 
{b) A conviction for a violation of this Subsection (2) is a second degree felony if it is subsequent 
to a conviction as defined in Subsection 41-6a-501 (2). 
~ {c) As used in this Subsection (2), "negligent" means simple negligence, the failure to exercise 
(3) 
that degree of care that reasonable and prudent persons exercise under like or similar 
circumstances. 
{a) Criminal homicide is automobile homicide, a second degree felony, if the person operates a 
vi motor vehicle in a criminally negligent manner causing the death of another and: 
{i) has sufficient alcohol in his body that a subsequent chemical test shows that the person has 
a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of the test; 
{ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and any 
drug to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely operating a vehicle; or 
1.£.l!) {iii) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of operation. 
{b) As used in this Subsection (3), "criminally negligent" means criminal negligence as defined by 
Subsection 76-2-103( 4 ). 
{ 4) The standards for chemical breath analysis as provided by Section 41-6a-515 and the 
provisions for the admissibility of chemical test results as provided by Section 41-6a-516 apply 
~ to determination and proof of blood alcohol content under this section. 
(5) Calculations of blood or breath alcohol concentration under this section shall be made in 
accordance with Subsection 41-6a-502(1 ). 
(6) The fact that a person charged with violating this section is or has been legally entitled to use 
alcohol or a drug is not a defense. 
~ (7) Evidence of a defendant's blood or breath alcohol content or drug content is admissible except 
when prohibited by Rules of Evidence or the constitution. 
(8) A person is guilty of a separate offense for each victim suffering bodily injury or serious bodily 
injury as a result of the person's violation of Section 41-6a-502 or death as a result of the 
person's violation of this section whether or not the injuries arise from the same episode of 
~ driving. 
Amended by Chapter 214, 2009 General Session 
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